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September 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

OSD and JCS reviews  
completed

FROM: AL HAIG

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with Secretary Laird  
during your Breakfast on Wednesday,  
September 8, 1971I. Items Secretary Laird May Raise

1. SALT. As you know, both Secretaries Packard and Laird are concerned about recent SALT developments. In a memorandum to you last Saturday (Tab A), Secretary Laird proposed that the next three weeks at Helsinki be spent in discussion of offensive limitations. Wayne Smith's memorandum to you recommending guidance for handling this issue with Secretary Laird is also at Tab A.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Missile Accuracy. As a result of comments made during the President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs on August 10, the Chiefs apparently believe that the President has given the go-ahead for efforts to improve the accuracy of both Poseidon and Minuteman. During the meeting in question the President agreed with General Ryan's comment that we must continue to push for increased accuracy and stated that it was essential that the U. S. push research and development leading towards increased accuracy.

If Secretary Laird raises the subject you should indicate that the President's remarks should not be interpreted as a decision on his part. If it is felt that increased accuracy is necessary and the Chiefs want to raise this subject again, it should be done in writing with a request for Presidential decision.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Contingency Measures to Strengthen RVNAF. Secretary Laird has reported on actions taken to prepare RVNAF for possible negotiating contingencies (Tab D). You may want to tell the Secretary that the President is pleased with the promptness of DOD in implementing these measures. (Only on the A-1 issue was there a mix-up.)

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ceasefire. Secretary Laird may want to know where matters stand on the ceasefire study. The SRG on Ceasefire is scheduled to meet on September 29, 1971.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

5. POW's. With the upcoming Annual Meeting of the National League of Families on September 26-27, the prisoner issue may again become active. Some of the wives are critical of the non-political stand of the group's leaders and may attempt to generate some unfavorable publicity. The Secretary may suggest an initiative on our part and may support a token appearance by the President before the League's annual meeting.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

6. NATO MBFR. With recent developments which may have an eroding effect on the strength of the NATO Alliance, it is particularly important that Defense focus on efforts to indicate our commitment to NATO and our determination to maintain its strength. We have three major projects in train:

-- to prepare for MBFR negotiations. This involves completion of the analysis started by the Verification Panel and formulation of specific options to be discussed with our allies in the December NATO Ministerial meetings.

-- to press our allies for major force improvements aimed at correcting critical conventional weaknesses and shifting a greater share of the burden to our allies.

-- to make improvements in the US force posture for NATO.  
(You may want to ask Secretary Laird if it would be productive

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to assess the role of US noncombat personnel in Europe to determine if any missions and/or personnel could be cut in order to provide a corresponding increase in our combat capabilities.)

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Defense planning for Asia. Our post-Vietnam strategy for Asia is a major unresolved question requiring Presidential attention. Preparations for a probable NSC meeting and Presidential decision are going reasonably well and will be reviewed again by the DPRC on September 15.

Ask Secretary Laird's cooperation in insuring that final strategic guidance is not sent to the JCS and the Services prior to consideration of the Asia issue by the DPRC and the President. (It is not unlikely that Secretary Laird will issue his strategy guidance prior to rather than following the NSC meeting.)

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Secretary's foreign travels. Secretary Laird wants to discuss with you his plans for trips in order to insure that there is no conflict with planned Presidential travel.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

9. Fort Bragg. During your last meeting with Secretary Laird on August 11 he raised the possibility of a Presidential visit to Fort Bragg to demonstrate support for the armed forces. A joint Army/Air Force exercise is scheduled for September 24, 27 or 29.

You may want to tell the Secretary that although you strongly endorse the concept of Presidential attendance at this exercise, these dates conflict with already scheduled Presidential business. You will be glad to support some future proposal for a Presidential visit to Fort Bragg. (Background material on this exercise is at Tab E.)

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

10. Cannikin. Secretary Laird may ask if there has been a final determination to proceed with the Cannikin test. You may want to indicate

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that the President will probably approve the test in early October.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

II. Items To Raise With Secretary Laird

1. Laos/Stennis. You may want to tell Secretary Laird about Chairman Stennis' letter to the President of September 2 (Tab F):

-- Stennis advises the President that he cannot support any further funding with respect to Laos as a part of the CIA budget for fiscal year 1973, and therefore urges that other funding alternatives be considered.

-- Stennis expresses the belief that for the CIA to continue funding any part of the Laos operation after FY 72 would be a serious mistake and possibly jeopardize the success with which the CIA carries out its other worldwide functions.

Explore with Secretary Laird steps which might be taken promptly to dissuade Senator Stennis from his proposed course of action which will unduly restrict our flexibility at a critical time in our Vietnamization program.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

2. RVNAF Improvements (NSDM 118). On September 4th the Secretary sent the President an interim report on the actions taken to implement NSDM 118 - the NSDM providing for combat pay, increased manning of combat units, and a possible expansion of RVNAF (Tab G). He has issued directives to JCS and MACV and actions pointing in the right direction have been taken. However, whether or not decisive action will be taken in time for the 1971-72 dry season remains to be seen.

You should impress on the Secretary the following:

-- The goal of a 90% manning level for combat units by January 1, 1972 established by the Secretary is the right way to proceed. MACV needs to be given a target and held to it.

-- The action on combat pay (a 100 piaster per day increase for troops out-of-country) may not be decisive enough. It represents about 30 cents or a bowl of soup. If we are to crack the desertion/morale problem, decisive action will be needed. We need a program and a deadline.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

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3. DPRC Force Structure Issues. The preparation of force structure issues is proceeding well considering the substantive complexity of the problems being analyzed. The four key problems being prepared for the President's consideration are: (1) Safeguard levels; (2) All-Volunteer Army funding; (3) Air defense; and (4) Intelligence. Secretary Packard plans to present these problems as well as a number of other related force and budgetary issues for decision by the end of October. If we proceed with this work program, Presidential consideration could be completed by mid-November, prior to Secretary Laird's formulation of a detailed defense program and budget. This would have the advantage of giving DOD enough time to work out the details without the pressures of major changes in the last months prior to presentation of the budget.

You may want to insure that this general approach is agreeable to Secretary Laird.

Discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

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